< draft-ietf-conex-concepts-uses-00.txt   draft-ietf-conex-concepts-uses-01.txt >
CONEX B. Briscoe CONEX T. Moncaster, Ed.
Internet-Draft BT Internet-Draft Moncaster Internet Consulting
Intended status: Informational R. Woundy Intended status: Informational J. Leslie, Ed.
Expires: May 19, 2011 Comcast Expires: October 16, 2011 JLC.net
T. Moncaster, Ed. B. Briscoe
Moncaster.com BT
J. Leslie, Ed. R. Woundy
JLC.net Comcast
November 15, 2010 D. McDysan
Verizon
April 14, 2011
ConEx Concepts and Use Cases ConEx Concepts and Use Cases
draft-ietf-conex-concepts-uses-00 draft-ietf-conex-concepts-uses-01
Abstract Abstract
Internet Service Providers (operators) are facing problems where Internet Service Providers (operators) are facing problems where
localized congestion prevents full utilization of the path between localized congestion prevents full utilization of the path between
sender and receiver at today's "broadband" speeds. Operators desire sender and receiver at today's "broadband" speeds. Operators desire
to control this congestion, which often appears to be caused by a to control this congestion, which often appears to be caused by a
small number of users consuming a large amount of bandwidth. small number of users consuming a large amount of bandwidth.
Building out more capacity along all of the path to handle this Building out more capacity along all of the path to handle this
congestion can be expensive and may not result in improvements for congestion can be expensive and may not result in improvements for
skipping to change at page 1, line 47 skipping to change at page 2, line 4
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 16, 2011.
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Congestion Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Congestion Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Existing Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Existing Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Exposing Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Exposing Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. ECN - a Step in the Right Direction . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. ECN - a Step in the Right Direction . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. ConEx Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. ConEx Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. ConEx as a basis for traffic management . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1. ConEx as a basis for traffic management . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. ConEx to incentivise scavenger transports . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. ConEx to incentivise scavenger transports . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Accounting for Congestion Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.3. Accounting for Congestion Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. ConEx as a form of differential QoS . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.4. ConEx as a form of differential QoS . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. Partial vs. Full Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.5. Partial vs. Full Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Other issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Statistical Multiplexing over Differing Timescales . . . . . . 14
6.1. Congestion as a Commercial Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. ConEx Objectives for This Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Information Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. ConEx as a Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.3. Additional Support Using other Measures and Mechanisms . . 16
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. Other issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1. Congestion as a Commercial Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.2. Information Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The growth of "always on" broadband connections, coupled with the The growth of "always on" broadband connections, coupled with the
steady increase in access speeds [OfCom], have caused unforeseen steady increase in access speeds, have caused unforeseen problems for
problems for network operators and users alike. Users are network operators and users alike. Users are increasingly seeing
increasingly seeing congestion at peak times and changes in usage congestion at peak times and changes in usage patterns (with the
patterns (with the growth of real-time streaming) simply serve to growth of real-time streaming) simply serve to exacerbate this.
exacerbate this. Operators want all their users to see a good Operators want all their users to see a good service but are unable
service but are unable to see where congestion problems originate. to see where congestion problems originate. But congestion results
But congestion results from sharing network capacity with others, not from sharing network capacity with others, not merely from using it.
merely from using it. In general, today's "DSL" and cable-internet In general, today's "DSL" and cable-internet users cannot "cause"
users cannot "cause" congestion in the absence of competing traffic. congestion in the absence of competing traffic. (Wireless operators
(Wireless operators and cellular internet have different tradeoffs and cellular internet have different tradeoffs which we will not
which we will not discuss here.) discuss here.)
Congestion generally results from the interaction of traffic from one Despite its central role in network control and management,
network operator's users with traffic from other users. The tools congestion is a remarkably hard conept to define. The discussions in
currently available don't allow an operator to identify which traffic [Bauer09] provide a good academic background. [RFC6077] defines it
contributes most to the congestion and so they are powerless to as "as a state or condition that occurs when network resources are
properly control it. overloaded, resulting in impairments for network users as objectively
measured by the probability of loss and/or delay." An economist
might define it as the condition where the utility of a given user
decreases due to an increase in network load. Common to these
definitions is the idea that an increase in load results in a
reduction of service from the network.
Congestion takes two distinct forms. The first results from the
interaction of traffic from one set of users with traffic from other
users, causing in a reduction in service (a cost) for all of them.
the second, often referred to as "self-congestion", occurs when an
increase in traffic from a single user causes that user to suffer a
worse service (for instance because their traffic is being "shaped"
by their ISP, or because they have an excessively large buffer in
their home router). ConEx is principally interested in the first
form of congestion since it involves informing those other users of
the impact you expect to have on them.
While building out more capacity to handle increased traffic is While building out more capacity to handle increased traffic is
always good, the expense and lead-time can be prohibitive, especially always good, the expense and lead-time can be prohibitive, especially
for network operators that charge flat-rate feeds to subscribers and for network operators that charge flat-rate feeds to subscribers and
are thus unable to charge heavier users more for causing more are thus unable to charge heavier users more for causing more
congestion [BB-incentive]. For an operator facing congestion caused congestion [BB-incentive]. The operators also face the challenge
that network traffic grows according to Moore's Law -- increasing
capacity may only be buying a few months grace before you are again
facing increasing congestion, reducing utility and customers
demanding a better service. For an operator facing congestion caused
by other operators' networks, building out its own capacity is by other operators' networks, building out its own capacity is
unlikely to solve the congestion problem. Operators are thus facing unlikely to solve the congestion problem. Operators are thus facing
increased pressure to find effective solutions to dealing with the increased pressure to find effective solutions to dealing with the
increasing bandwidth demands of all users. increasing bandwidth demands of all users.
The growth of "scavenger" behaviour (e.g. [LEDBAT]) helps to reduce The growth of "scavenger" behaviour (e.g. [LEDBAT]) helps to reduce
congestion, but can actually make the problem less tractable. These congestion, but can actually make the problem less tractable. These
users are trying to make good use of the capacity of the path while users are trying to make good use of the capacity of the path while
minimising their own costs. Thus, users of such services may show minimising their own costs. Thus, users of such services may show
very heavy total traffic up until the moment congestion is detected very heavy total traffic up until the moment congestion is detected
(at the Transport Layer), but then will immediately back off. (at the Transport Layer), but then will immediately back off.
Monitoring (at the Internet Layer) cannot detect this congestion Monitoring (at the Internet Layer) cannot detect this congestion
avoidance if the congestion in question is in a different domain avoidance if the congestion in question is in a different domain
further along the path; and must treat such users as congestion- further along the path and hence such users may get tretated as
causing users. congestion-causing users.
The ConEx working group proposes that Internet Protocol (IP) packets The ConEx working group proposes that Internet Protocol (IP) packets
will carry additional ConEx information. The exact protocol details will carry additional ConEx information. The exact protocol details
are not described in this document, but the ConEx information will be are not described in this document, but the ConEx information will be
sufficient to allow any node in the network to see how much sufficient to allow any node in the network to see how much
congestion is attributable to a given traffic flow. See congestion is attributable to a given traffic flow. See
[ConEx-Abstract-Mech] for further details. [ConEx-Abstract-Mech] for further details.
Changes from previous drafts (to be removed by the RFC Editor): Changes from previous drafts (to be removed by the RFC Editor):
From draft-ietf-conex-concepts-uses-00 to -01:
Added section on timescales: Section 6
Revised introduction to clarify congestion definitions
Changed source for congestion definition in Section 2
Other minor changes
From draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses-02 to From draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses-02 to
draft-ietf-conex-concepts-uses-00 (per decisions of working group): draft-ietf-conex-concepts-uses-00 (per decisions of working group):
Removed section on DDoS mitigation use case. Removed section on DDoS mitigation use case.
Removed appendix on ConEx Architectural Elements. PLEASE NOTE: Removed appendix on ConEx Architectural Elements. PLEASE NOTE:
Alignment of terminology with the Abstract Mechanism draft has Alignment of terminology with the Abstract Mechanism draft has
been deferred to the next version. been deferred to the next version.
From draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses-01 to From draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses-01 to
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Improved document structure. Merged sections on Exposing Improved document structure. Merged sections on Exposing
Congestion and ECN. Congestion and ECN.
Added new section on ConEx requirements with a ConEx Issues Added new section on ConEx requirements with a ConEx Issues
subsection. Text for these came from the start of the old ConEx subsection. Text for these came from the start of the old ConEx
Use Cases section Use Cases section
Added a sub-section on Partial vs Full Deployment Section 5.5 Added a sub-section on Partial vs Full Deployment Section 5.5
Added a discussion on ConEx as a Business Secret Section 6.1 Added a discussion on ConEx as a Business Secret Section 7.1
From draft-conex-mechanism-00 to From draft-conex-mechanism-00 to
draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses-00: draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses-00:
Changed filename to draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses. Changed filename to draft-moncaster-conex-concepts-uses.
Changed title to ConEx Concepts and Use Cases. Changed title to ConEx Concepts and Use Cases.
Chose uniform capitalisation of ConEx. Chose uniform capitalisation of ConEx.
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are NOT defined terms). are NOT defined terms).
Re-worded bullet on distinguishing ConEx and non-ConEx traffic in Re-worded bullet on distinguishing ConEx and non-ConEx traffic in
Section 5. Section 5.
2. Definitions 2. Definitions
In this section we define a number of terms that are used throughout In this section we define a number of terms that are used throughout
the document. The key definition is that of congestion, which has a the document. The key definition is that of congestion, which has a
number of meanings depending on context. The definition we use in number of meanings depending on context. The definition we use in
this document is based on the definition in [Padhye] where congestion this document is based on the definition in [RFC6077]. This list of
is viewed as a probability that a packet will be dropped. This list definitions is supplementary to that in [ConEx-Abstract-Mech].
of definitions is supplementary to that in [ConEx-Abstract-Mech].
Congestion: Congestion is a measure of the probability that a packet Congestion: Congestion occurs when any user's traffic suffers
will be marked or dropped as it traverses a queue. increased delay, loss or ECN marking as a result of one or more
network resources being overloaded.
flow: a series of packets from a single sender to a single receiver Flow: a series of packets from a single sender to a single receiver
that are treated by that sender as belonging to a single stream that are treated by that sender as belonging to a single stream
for the purposes of congestion control. NB in general this is not for the purposes of congestion control. NB in general this is not
the same as the aggregate of all traffic between the sender and the same as the aggregate of all traffic between the sender and
receiver. receiver.
Congestion-rate: For any granularity of traffic (packet, flow, Congestion-rate: For any granularity of traffic (packet, flow,
aggregate, etc.), the instantaneous rate of traffic discarded or aggregate, etc.), the instantaneous rate of traffic discarded or
marked due to congestion. Conceptually, the instantaneous bit- marked due to congestion. Conceptually, the instantaneous bit-
rate of the traffic multiplied by the instantaneous congestion it rate of the traffic multiplied by the instantaneous congestion it
is experiencing. is experiencing.
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aggressively than TCP for any elastic traffic. Indeed they will aggressively than TCP for any elastic traffic. Indeed they will
actually have an incentive to use fully weighted congestion controls actually have an incentive to use fully weighted congestion controls
that allow traffic to cause congestion in proportion to its priority. that allow traffic to cause congestion in proportion to its priority.
Traffic which backs off more aggressively than TCP will see Traffic which backs off more aggressively than TCP will see
congestion charges remain the same (or even drop) as congestion congestion charges remain the same (or even drop) as congestion
increases; traffic which backs off less aggressively will see charges increases; traffic which backs off less aggressively will see charges
rise, but the user may be prepared to accept this if it is high- rise, but the user may be prepared to accept this if it is high-
priority traffic; traffic which backs off not at all will see charges priority traffic; traffic which backs off not at all will see charges
rise dramatically. rise dramatically.
6. Other issues 6. Statistical Multiplexing over Differing Timescales
6.1. Congestion as a Commercial Secret Access networks are usually provisioned assuming statistical
multiplexing, where end-users are presumed not all to use their
maximum bandwidth simultaneously. Typically, an ISP might design
access networks with shared resources (e.g., circuits, ports,
schedulers) dimensioned in proportion to the sum of average usage by
the customers involved. Generally, ISPs monitor actual usage
averaged over some time period (typically stated in minutes) to plan
when upgrades to shared resources will be needed.
Almost always, they find that certain busy periods of the day have
higher usage; and that actual contention for bandwidth at a shared
resource (e.g., circuit, port, scheduler) is limited to those
periods. This leads to "economic congestion" as defined in Section
3.4 of [Bauer09], where traffic by one end-user imposes a "cost" of
reduced utility on other users. Sometimes, there is an extended
period between economic congestion being first observed and the
completion of upgrades. In other cases, a trend of "economic
congestion" is used by a service provider before congestion as
defined in the abstract mechanism (loss or ECN marking) occurs.
During busy periods, it has been observed that roughly 20% of the
end-users are using 80% of the bandwidth [Varian]. We call this
roughly-20% "heavy users", and the others "light users". Left to
itself, this situation means that heavy users cause queues to fill at
a rate much greater than light users do. (Note that this heavy/light
categorization is for illustrative purposes since there is actually a
continuum of "heaviness" across users.) When both heavy and light
users pay the same flat rate, ISPs believe heavy users should bear
more of the "cost" of reduced utility.
When all users have unlimited access to a shared resource bottleneck,
this problem is the most severe since maximum per user bandwidth is
that of the shared resource. In order to provide more control over
the maximum rate at which individual users may send, many ISPs have
deployed "traffic shapers" to limit bandwidth available to an
individual user during all time periods. Note that this limits the
per user maximum bandwidth in the sub-second timeframe of the shaper
queue. Currently, these "shapers" make no distinction between busy
periods where shared resource congestion may occur and periods when
no congestion occurs.
During a period of higher usage, a shared resource becomes the
bottleneck and causes filling of a shared queue or individual user
shaper queues. However, heavy users create much more queuing and
therefore potentially more congestion volume Section 2 as compared
with lighter users. This means that during periods of higher usage,
heavier and lighter users see comparable congestion (i.e., packet
loss or ECN marking). Thus, the overall utility (i.e., probability
of a packet not being lost or ECN marked) is reduced by the fewer
heavier users at the expense of the many lighter users.
During periods of lighter usage, heavier users will fill their
individual shaper queues, potentially creating loss or ECN marking,
such that TCP congestion-control does what the ISP desires and cuts
back the sending rate giving the user the expected maximum bandwidth.
6.1. ConEx Objectives for This Issue
ConEx should provide better information for a provider to address the
"economic congestion" problem. Specifically, ConEx should help to
distinguish which users cause queue-filling over a time interval
matching the economic congestion and statistical multiplexing
algorithm time scales. This can range from seconds, to minutes, to
hours. It is also desirable to distinguish "self-congestion" where
there is no contention for a shared resource bandwidth (e.g.,
circuit, port, scheduler), which is referred to as "inter-user
congestion" in the following. If this is visible to end-users, they
could use an out-of-band mechanism to "go faster" if only "self-
congestion" is limiting their throughput.
There are (at least) three approaches for addressing this issue.
1. Treat "self-congestion" the same as "inter-user congestion" since
they both create congestion as perceived by the flow user;
2. Signal more information to the receiver about the cause of loss
since the remedy may differ;
3. Process (and generate) ConEx information at the same network
element which implements the shaper, which has knowledge of the
configured maximum bandwidth for the users as well as local
shared resource congestion.
For the most part, these don't require any changes to the abstract
mechanism; but a subcase of 2), where the traffic-shaper might use
ConEx to signal that the "congestion" is actually due to traffic-
shaping, not shared resource contention, could require additional
signaling to be defined in the ConEx protocol.
Note that during busy periods "self congestion" might not be the
limiting factor, but there will inevitably be less-busy periods where
"self-congestion" will predominate.
6.2. ConEx as a Solution
Over a time period related to the statistical multiplexing or
economic congestion interval (e.g., many seconds to minutes to hours)
total up the number of bytes that have been congestion marked and the
total number of bytes sent per end-user. Compute the ratio of
congested bytes to total bytes. This measures the average rate per
user.
Quantizing users into classes using one threshold on total and and
another threshold on ratio results in a grid that identifies four
classes of user:
+------------+-------------+-------------+
| | Volume |
| Ratio | Large | Small |
+------------+-------------+-------------+
| High | Heavy User | Bursty User |
+------------+-------------+-------------+
| Low | LEDBAT User | Light User |
+------------+-------------+-------------+
(Where "LEDBAT User" includes other Less-than-Best-Effort algorithms.)
Figure 1: Four Classes of User
Note that Bursty and Heavy Users contribute more to congestion
marking, but a Bursty user contributes less overall congestion
marking and may be creating shorter periods of queue filling as
compared with heavy users. LEDBAT and light users create less to
congestion marking, with LEDBAT users able to transfer more volume as
compared with light users since LEDBAT users back off before
congestion marking occurs. An operator might reasonably take this
into account in their shaping algorithms.
6.3. Additional Support Using other Measures and Mechanisms
An additional congestion measure of burstiness (in addition to
"congestion") would allow nodes upstream from the node implementing
the shaper to implement traffic management. This measure could be
derived from signals in the abstract mechanism but would require (a
majority) of the heavier senders and receivers to implement conex and
also would only work if loss or ECN marking occurs. Also, signaling
a measure of the burstiness (or something related to it) would
partially address the scenario where no loss or ECN marking occurs.
As an alternative, a "light weight" TCP proxy might be implemented at
the network element containing the shaper, and an upstream network
element (e.g., an ingress router), could potentially create a ConEx
control loop between these network elements to provide more optimal
balance between heavier and lighter users during congested intervals.
This would be a closed domain where the signals could be implicitly
trusted. The burstiness measure could be communicated using TCP
extensions between these proxies.
There is also the aspect of "self congestion" where a traffic-shaper
is at the access node. Using the current mechanisms, the receiver
cannot tell the difference between "self-congestion" and "inter-user
congestion." Adding a signal to the abstract mechanism could enable
a receiver to inform the sender about the cause of congestion,
enabling the sender to request that the traffic-shaper parameters
change to enable the flow to "go faster".
7. Other issues
7.1. Congestion as a Commercial Secret
Network operators have long viewed the congestion levels in their Network operators have long viewed the congestion levels in their
network as a business secret. In some ways this harks back to the network as a business secret. In some ways this harks back to the
days of fixed-line telecommunications where congestion manifested as days of fixed-line telecommunications where congestion manifested as
failed connections or dropped calls. But even in modern data-centric failed connections or dropped calls. But even in modern data-centric
packet networks congestion is viewed as a secret not to be shared packet networks congestion is viewed as a secret not to be shared
with competitors. It can be debated whether this view is sensible, with competitors. It can be debated whether this view is sensible,
but it may make operators uneasy about deploying ConEx. The but it may make operators uneasy about deploying ConEx. The
following two examples highlight some of the arguments used: following two examples highlight some of the arguments used:
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want their customers to get a decent service and so they want the want their customers to get a decent service and so they want the
backhaul to be relatively uncongested. If there is competition, backhaul to be relatively uncongested. If there is competition,
operators will seek to reassure their customers (the operators) operators will seek to reassure their customers (the operators)
that their network is not congested in order to attract their that their network is not congested in order to attract their
custom. Some operators may see ConEx as a threat since it will custom. Some operators may see ConEx as a threat since it will
enable those operators to see the actual congestion in their enable those operators to see the actual congestion in their
network. On the other hand, operators with low congestion could network. On the other hand, operators with low congestion could
use ConEx to show how well their network performs, and so might use ConEx to show how well their network performs, and so might
have an incentive to enable it. have an incentive to enable it.
o Operators would like to be part of the lucrative content provision o ISPs would like to be part of the lucrative content provision
market. Currently the ISP can gain a competitive edge as it can market. Currently the ISP can gain a competitive edge as it can
put its own content in a higher QoS class, whereas traffic from put its own content in a higher QoS class, whereas traffic from
content providers has to use the Best Effort class. The ISP may content providers has to use the Best Effort class. The ISP may
take the view that if they can conceal the congestion level in take the view that if they can conceal the congestion level in
their Best Effort class this will make it harder for the content their Best Effort class this will make it harder for the content
provider to maintain a good level of QoS. But in reality the provider to maintain a good level of QoS. But in reality the
Content Provider will just use the feedback mechanisms in Content Provider will just use the feedback mechanisms in
streaming protocols such as Adobe Flash to monitor the congestion. streaming protocols such as Adobe Flash to monitor the congestion.
Of course some might say that the idea of keeping congestion secret Of course some might say that the idea of keeping congestion secret
is silly. After all, end-hosts already have knowledge of the is silly. After all, end-hosts already have knowledge of the
congestion throughout the network, albeit only along specific paths, congestion throughout the network, albeit only along specific paths,
and operators can work out that there is persistent congestion as and operators can work out that there is persistent congestion as
their customers will be suffering degraded network performance. their customers will be suffering degraded network performance.
6.2. Information Security 7.2. Information Security
make a source believe it has seen more congestion than it has make a source believe it has seen more congestion than it has
hijack a user's identity and make it appear they are dishonest at an hijack a user's identity and make it appear they are dishonest at an
egress policer egress policer
clear or otherwise tamper with the ConEx markings clear or otherwise tamper with the ConEx markings
... ...
{ToDo} Write these up properly... {ToDo} Write these up properly...
7. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This document proposes a mechanism tagging onto Explicit Congestion This document proposes a mechanism tagging onto Explicit Congestion
Notification [RFC3168], and inherits the security issues listed Notification [RFC3168], and inherits the security issues listed
therein. The additional issues from ConEx markings relate to the therein. The additional issues from ConEx markings relate to the
degree of trust each forwarding point places in the ConEx markings it degree of trust each forwarding point places in the ConEx markings it
receives, which is a business decision mostly orthogonal to the receives, which is a business decision mostly orthogonal to the
markings themselves. markings themselves.
One expected use of exposed congestion information is to hold the One expected use of exposed congestion information is to hold the
end-to-end transport and the network accountable to each other. The end-to-end transport and the network accountable to each other. The
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congestion. This will be a particular problem with sources of congestion. This will be a particular problem with sources of
flooding attacks. "Policing" mechanisms have been proposed to flooding attacks. "Policing" mechanisms have been proposed to
deal with this. deal with this.
In addition there are potential problems from source spoofing. A In addition there are potential problems from source spoofing. A
malicious sender can pretend to be another user by spoofing the malicious sender can pretend to be another user by spoofing the
source address. Congestion Exposure allows for "Policers" and source address. Congestion Exposure allows for "Policers" and
"Traffic Shapers" so as to be robust against injection of false "Traffic Shapers" so as to be robust against injection of false
congestion information into the forward path. congestion information into the forward path.
8. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA. This document does not require actions by IANA.
9. Acknowledgments 10. Acknowledgments
Bob Briscoe is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project (ICT- Bob Briscoe is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project (ICT-
216372) supported by the European Community under its Seventh 216372) supported by the European Community under its Seventh
Framework Programme. The views expressed here are those of the Framework Programme. The views expressed here are those of the
author only. author only.
The authors would like to thank Contributing Authors Bernard Aboba, The authors would like to thank the many people that have commented
Joao Taveira Araujo, Louise Burness, Alissa Cooper, Philip Eardley, on this document. Bernard Aboba, Mikael Abrahamsson, Joao Taveira
Michael Menth, and Hannes Tschofenig for their inputs to this Araujo, Steve Bauer, Caitlin Bestler, Steven Blake, Louise Burness,
document. Useful feedback was also provided by Dirk Kutscher. Alissa Cooper, Philip Eardley, Matthew Ford, Ingemar Johansson, Mirja
Kuehlewind, Dirk Kutscher, Zhu Lei, Kevin Mason, Michael Menth, Chris
10. References Morrow, Hannes Tschofenig and Stuart Venters. Please accept our
apologies if your name has been missed off this list.
10.1. Normative References
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black,
"The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168,
September 2001.
10.2. Informative References 11. Informative References
[BB-incentive] MIT Communications Futures Program (CFP) and [BB-incentive] MIT Communications Futures Program (CFP) and
Cambridge University Communications Research Cambridge University Communications Research
Network, "The Broadband Incentive Problem", Network, "The Broadband Incentive Problem",
September 2005. September 2005.
[Bauer09] Bauer, S., Clark, D., and W. Lehr, "The
Evolution of Internet Congestion", 2009.
[ConEx-Abstract-Mech] Briscoe, B., "Congestion Exposure (ConEx) [ConEx-Abstract-Mech] Briscoe, B., "Congestion Exposure (ConEx)
Concepts and Abstract Mechanism", Concepts and Abstract Mechanism",
draft-mathis-conex-abstract-mech-00 (work in draft-ietf-conex-abstract-mech-00 (work in
progress), October 2010. progress), March 2011.
[Design-Philosophy] Clarke, D., "The Design Philosophy of the [Design-Philosophy] Clarke, D., "The Design Philosophy of the
DARPA Internet Protocols", 1988. DARPA Internet Protocols", 1988.
[Fair-use] Broadband Choices, "Truth about 'fair usage' [Fair-use] Broadband Choices, "Truth about 'fair usage'
broadband", 2009. broadband", 2009.
[Fairer-faster] Briscoe, B., "A Fairer Faster Internet [Fairer-faster] Briscoe, B., "A Fairer Faster Internet
Protocol", IEEE Spectrum Dec 2008 pp38-43, Protocol", IEEE Spectrum Dec 2008 pp38-43,
December 2008. December 2008.
skipping to change at page 17, line 22 skipping to change at page 21, line 12
draft-ietf-ledbat-congestion-01 (work in draft-ietf-ledbat-congestion-01 (work in
progress), March 2010. progress), March 2010.
[Malice] Briscoe, B., "Using Self Interest to Prevent [Malice] Briscoe, B., "Using Self Interest to Prevent
Malice; Fixing the Denial of Service Flaw of Malice; Fixing the Denial of Service Flaw of
the Internet", WESII - Workshop on the the Internet", WESII - Workshop on the
Economics of Securing the Information Economics of Securing the Information
Infrastructure 2006, 2006, <http:// Infrastructure 2006, 2006, <http://
wesii.econinfosec.org/draft.php?paper_id=19>. wesii.econinfosec.org/draft.php?paper_id=19>.
[OfCom] Ofcom: Office of Communications, "UK Broadband
Speeds 2008: Research report", January 2009.
[Padhye] Padhye, J., Firoiu, V., Towsley, D., and J. [Padhye] Padhye, J., Firoiu, V., Towsley, D., and J.
Kurose, "Modeling TCP Throughput: A Simple Kurose, "Modeling TCP Throughput: A Simple
Model and its Empirical Validation", ACM Model and its Empirical Validation", ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communications Review Vol SIGCOMM Computer Communications Review Vol
28(4), pages 303-314, May 1998. 28(4), pages 303-314, May 1998.
[Policing-freedom] Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A., and T. Moncaster, [Policing-freedom] Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A., and T. Moncaster,
"Policing Freedom to Use the Internet Resource "Policing Freedom to Use the Internet Resource
Pool", RE-Arch 2008 hosted at the 2008 CoNEXT Pool", RE-Arch 2008 hosted at the 2008 CoNEXT
conference , December 2008. conference , December 2008.
skipping to change at page 17, line 49 skipping to change at page 21, line 36
23 (2), April 2005. 23 (2), April 2005.
[RFC2309] Braden, B., Clark, D., Crowcroft, J., Davie, [RFC2309] Braden, B., Clark, D., Crowcroft, J., Davie,
B., Deering, S., Estrin, D., Floyd, S., B., Deering, S., Estrin, D., Floyd, S.,
Jacobson, V., Minshall, G., Partridge, C., Jacobson, V., Minshall, G., Partridge, C.,
Peterson, L., Ramakrishnan, K., Shenker, S., Peterson, L., Ramakrishnan, K., Shenker, S.,
Wroclawski, J., and L. Zhang, "Recommendations Wroclawski, J., and L. Zhang, "Recommendations
on Queue Management and Congestion Avoidance on Queue Management and Congestion Avoidance
in the Internet", RFC 2309, April 1998. in the Internet", RFC 2309, April 1998.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black,
"The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168,
September 2001.
[RFC6077] Papadimitriou, D., Welzl, M., Scharf, M., and
B. Briscoe, "Open Research Issues in Internet
Congestion Control", RFC 6077, February 2011.
[Re-Feedback] Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A., Di Cairano- [Re-Feedback] Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A., Di Cairano-
Gilfedder, C., Salvatori, A., Soppera, A., and Gilfedder, C., Salvatori, A., Soppera, A., and
M. Koyabe, "Policing Congestion Response in an M. Koyabe, "Policing Congestion Response in an
Internetwork Using Re-Feedback", ACM SIGCOMM Internetwork Using Re-Feedback", ACM SIGCOMM
CCR 35(4)277--288, August 2005, <http:// CCR 35(4)277--288, August 2005, <http://
www.acm.org/sigs/sigcomm/sigcomm2005/ www.acm.org/sigs/sigcomm/sigcomm2005/
techprog.html#session8>. techprog.html#session8>.
[Savage] Savage, S., Wetherall, D., and T. Anderson, [Savage] Savage, S., Wetherall, D., and T. Anderson,
"TCP Congestion Control with a Misbehaving "TCP Congestion Control with a Misbehaving
Receiver", ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Receiver", ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review , 1999. Review , 1999.
[Varian] Varian, H., "Congestion pricing principles",
Technical Plenary 78th IETF Meeting, July .
[re-ecn-motive] Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A., Moncaster, T., and [re-ecn-motive] Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A., Moncaster, T., and
A. Smith, "Re-ECN: A Framework for adding A. Smith, "Re-ECN: A Framework for adding
Congestion Accountability to TCP/IP", Congestion Accountability to TCP/IP",
draft-briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp-motivation-02 draft-briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp-motivation-02
(work in progress), October 2010. (work in progress), October 2010.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Toby Moncaster (editor)
Moncaster Internet Consulting
Dukes
Layer Marney
Colchester CO5 9UZ
UK
EMail: toby@moncaster.com
John Leslie (editor)
JLC.net
10 Souhegan Street
Milford, NH 03055
US
EMail: john@jlc.net
Bob Briscoe Bob Briscoe
BT BT
B54/77, Adastral Park B54/77, Adastral Park
Martlesham Heath Martlesham Heath
Ipswich IP5 3RE Ipswich IP5 3RE
UK UK
Phone: +44 1473 645196 Phone: +44 1473 645196
EMail: bob.briscoe@bt.com EMail: bob.briscoe@bt.com
URI: http://bobbriscoe.net/ URI: http://bobbriscoe.net/
skipping to change at page 18, line 32 skipping to change at page 23, line 4
Bob Briscoe Bob Briscoe
BT BT
B54/77, Adastral Park B54/77, Adastral Park
Martlesham Heath Martlesham Heath
Ipswich IP5 3RE Ipswich IP5 3RE
UK UK
Phone: +44 1473 645196 Phone: +44 1473 645196
EMail: bob.briscoe@bt.com EMail: bob.briscoe@bt.com
URI: http://bobbriscoe.net/ URI: http://bobbriscoe.net/
Richard Woundy Richard Woundy
Comcast Comcast
Comcast Cable Communications Comcast Cable Communications
27 Industrial Avenue 27 Industrial Avenue
Chelmsford, MA 01824 Chelmsford, MA 01824
US US
EMail: richard_woundy@cable.comcast.com EMail: richard_woundy@cable.comcast.com
URI: http://www.comcast.com URI: http://www.comcast.com
Toby Moncaster (editor)
Moncaster.com
Dukes
Layer Marney
Colchester CO5 9UZ
UK
EMail: toby@moncaster.com Dave McDysan
Verizon
John Leslie (editor) 22001 Loudon County Pkwy
JLC.net Ashburn, VA 20147
10 Souhegan Street
Milford, NH 03055
US US
EMail: john@jlc.net EMail: dave.mcdysan@verizon.com
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