draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-04.txt   draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-05.txt 
Transport Area Working Group B. Briscoe Transport Area Working Group B. Briscoe
Internet-Draft BT Internet-Draft BT
Updates: 3168, 4301 October 24, 2009 Updates: 3168, 4301 December 18, 2009
(if approved) (if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: April 27, 2010 Expires: June 21, 2010
Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion Notification Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion Notification
draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-04 draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-05
Abstract
This document redefines how the explicit congestion notification
(ECN) field of the IP header should be constructed on entry to and
exit from any IP in IP tunnel. On encapsulation it updates RFC3168
to bring all IP in IP tunnels (v4 or v6) into line with RFC4301 IPsec
ECN processing. On decapsulation it updates both RFC3168 and RFC4301
to add new behaviours for previously unused combinations of inner and
outer header. The new rules ensure the ECN field is correctly
propagated across a tunnel whether it is used to signal one or two
severity levels of congestion, whereas before only one severity level
was supported. Tunnel endpoints can be updated in any order without
affecting pre-existing uses of the ECN field (backward compatible).
Nonetheless, operators wanting to support two severity levels (e.g.
for pre-congestion notification--PCN) can require compliance with
this new specification. A thorough analysis of the reasoning for
these changes and the implications is included. In the unlikely
event that the new rules do not meet a specific need, RFC4774 gives
guidance on designing alternate ECN semantics and this document
extends that to include tunnelling issues.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 34 skipping to change at page 2, line 9
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 21, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Abstract include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
This document redefines how the explicit congestion notification described in the BSD License.
(ECN) field of the IP header should be constructed on entry to and
exit from any IP in IP tunnel. On encapsulation it updates RFC3168
to bring all IP in IP tunnels (v4 or v6) into line with RFC4301 IPsec
ECN processing. On decapsulation it updates both RFC3168 and RFC4301
to add new behaviours for previously unused combinations of inner and
outer header. The new rules propagate the ECN field whether it is
used to signal one or two severity levels of congestion, whereas
before they propagated only one. Tunnel endpoints can be updated in
any order without affecting pre-existing uses of the ECN field
(backward compatible). Nonetheless, operators wanting to support two
severity levels (e.g. for pre-congestion notification--PCN) can
require compliance with this new specification. A thorough analysis
of the reasoning for these changes and the implications is included.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Summary of Pre-Existing RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3. Summary of Pre-Existing RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Encapsulation at Tunnel Ingress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1. Encapsulation at Tunnel Ingress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Decapsulation at Tunnel Egress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2. Decapsulation at Tunnel Egress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. New ECN Tunnelling Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. New ECN Tunnelling Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Default Tunnel Ingress Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Default Tunnel Ingress Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Default Tunnel Egress Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. Default Tunnel Egress Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. Encapsulation Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3. Encapsulation Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4. Single Mode of Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.4. Single Mode of Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Updates to Earlier RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. Updates to Earlier RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Changes to RFC4301 ECN processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.1. Changes to RFC4301 ECN processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2. Changes to RFC3168 ECN processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.2. Changes to RFC3168 ECN processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3. Motivation for Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.3. Motivation for Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3.1. Motivation for Changing Encapsulation . . . . . . . . 20 5.3.1. Motivation for Changing Encapsulation . . . . . . . . 21
5.3.2. Motivation for Changing Decapsulation . . . . . . . . 21 5.3.2. Motivation for Changing Decapsulation . . . . . . . . 22
6. Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1. Non-Issues Updating Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.1. Non-Issues Updating Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2. Non-Update of RFC4301 IPsec Encapsulation . . . . . . . . 24 6.2. Non-Update of RFC4301 IPsec Encapsulation . . . . . . . . 25
6.3. Update to RFC3168 Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.3. Update to RFC3168 Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Design Principles for Future Non-Default Schemes . . . . . . . 25 7. Design Principles for Alternate ECN Tunnelling Semantics . . . 26
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12. Comments Solicited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Appendix A. Early ECN Tunnelling RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Appendix B. Design Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix A. Early ECN Tunnelling RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 B.1. Security Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix B. Design Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 B.2. Control Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B.1. Security Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 B.3. Management Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.2. Control Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Appendix C. Contribution to Congestion across a Tunnel . . . . . 37
B.3. Management Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix D. Why Losing ECT(1) on Decapsulation Impedes PCN . . . 38
Appendix C. Contribution to Congestion across a Tunnel . . . . . 36 Appendix E. Why Resetting ECN on Encapsulation Impedes PCN . . . 39
Appendix D. Why Losing ECT(1) on Decapsulation Impedes PCN . . . 37
Appendix E. Why Resetting ECN on Encapsulation Impedes PCN . . . 38
Appendix F. Compromise on Decap with ECT(1) Inner and ECT(0) Appendix F. Compromise on Decap with ECT(1) Inner and ECT(0)
Outer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Outer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix G. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Appendix G. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Request to the RFC Editor (to be removed on publication): Request to the RFC Editor (to be removed on publication):
In the RFC index, RFC3168 should be identified as an update to In the RFC index, RFC3168 should be identified as an update to
RFC2003. RFC4301 should be identified as an update to RFC3168. RFC2003. RFC4301 should be identified as an update to RFC3168.
Changes from previous drafts (to be removed by the RFC Editor) Changes from previous drafts (to be removed by the RFC Editor)
Full text differences between IETF draft versions are available at Full text differences between IETF draft versions are available at
<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/tsvwg/draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel/>, and <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/tsvwg/draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel/>, and
between earlier individual draft versions at between earlier individual draft versions at
<http://www.briscoe.net/pubs.html#ecn-tunnel> <http://www.briscoe.net/pubs.html#ecn-tunnel>
From ietf-03 to ietf-04 (current): From ietf-04 to ietf-05 (current):
* Functional changes:
+ Section 4.2: ECT(1) outer with Not-ECT inner: reverted to
forwarding as Not-ECT (as in RFC3168 & RFC4301), rather than
dropping.
+ Altered rationale in bullet 3 of Section 5.3.2 to justify
this.
+ Distinguished alarms for dangerous and invalid combinations
and allowed combinations that are valid in some tunnel
configurations but dangerous in others to be alarmed at the
discretion of the implementer and/or operator.
+ Altered advice on designing alternate ECN tunnelling
semantics to reflect the above changes.
* Textual changes:
+ Changed "Future non-default schemes" to "Alternate ECN
Tunnelling Semantics" throughout.
+ Cut down Appendix D and Appendix E for brevity.
+ A number of clarifying edits & updated refs.
From ietf-03 to ietf-04:
* Functional changes: none * Functional changes: none
* Structural changes: * Structural changes:
+ Added "Open Issues" appendix + Added "Open Issues" appendix
* Textual changes: * Textual changes:
+ Section title: "Changes from Earlier RFCs" -> "Updates to + Section title: "Changes from Earlier RFCs" -> "Updates to
skipping to change at page 7, line 47 skipping to change at page 8, line 27
Roadmap), added new Introductory subsection on "Scope" and Roadmap), added new Introductory subsection on "Scope" and
improved clarity; improved clarity;
* Added Design Guidelines for New Encapsulations of Congestion * Added Design Guidelines for New Encapsulations of Congestion
Notification; Notification;
* Considerably clarified the Backward Compatibility section * Considerably clarified the Backward Compatibility section
(Section 6); (Section 6);
* Considerably extended the Security Considerations section * Considerably extended the Security Considerations section
(Section 9); (Section 8);
* Summarised the primary rationale much better in the * Summarised the primary rationale much better in the
conclusions; conclusions;
* Added numerous extra acknowledgements; * Added numerous extra acknowledgements;
* Added Appendix E. "Why resetting CE on encapsulation harms * Added Appendix E. "Why resetting CE on encapsulation harms
PCN", Appendix C. "Contribution to Congestion across a Tunnel" PCN", Appendix C. "Contribution to Congestion across a Tunnel"
and Appendix D. "Ideal Decapsulation Rules"; and Appendix D. "Ideal Decapsulation Rules";
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the ECN field, and the other which blocked all propagation of ECN the ECN field, and the other which blocked all propagation of ECN
changes. changes.
Unfortunately, this entirely reasonable sequence of standards actions Unfortunately, this entirely reasonable sequence of standards actions
resulted in a perverse outcome; non-IPsec tunnels (RFC3168) blocked resulted in a perverse outcome; non-IPsec tunnels (RFC3168) blocked
the 2-bit covert channel, while IPsec tunnels (RFC4301) did not--at the 2-bit covert channel, while IPsec tunnels (RFC4301) did not--at
least not at the ingress. At the egress, both IPsec and non-IPsec least not at the ingress. At the egress, both IPsec and non-IPsec
tunnels still partially restricted propagation of the full ECN field. tunnels still partially restricted propagation of the full ECN field.
The trigger for the changes in this document was the introduction of The trigger for the changes in this document was the introduction of
pre-congestion notification (PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]) to pre-congestion notification (PCN [RFC5670]) to the IETF standards
the IETF standards track. PCN needs the ECN field to be copied at a track. PCN needs the ECN field to be copied at a tunnel ingress and
tunnel ingress and it needs four states of congestion signalling to it needs four states of congestion signalling to be propagated at the
be propagated at the egress, but pre-existing tunnels only propagate egress, but pre-existing tunnels only propagate three in the ECN
three in the ECN field. field.
This document draws on currently unused (CU) combinations of inner This document draws on currently unused (CU) combinations of inner
and outer headers to add tunnelling of four-state congestion and outer headers to add tunnelling of four-state congestion
signalling to RFC3168 and RFC4301. Operators of tunnels who signalling to RFC3168 and RFC4301. Operators of tunnels who
specifically want to support four states can require that all their specifically want to support four states can require that all their
tunnels comply with this specification. Nonetheless, all tunnel tunnels comply with this specification. Nonetheless, all tunnel
endpoint implementations (RFC4301, RFC3168, RFC2481, RFC2401, endpoint implementations (RFC4301, RFC3168, RFC2481, RFC2401,
RFC2003) can safely be updated to this new specification as part of RFC2003) can safely be updated to this new specification as part of
general code maintenance. This will gradually add support for four general code maintenance. This will gradually add support for four
congestion states to the Internet. Existing three state schemes will congestion states to the Internet. Existing three state schemes will
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Resetting ECN: On encapsulation, setting the ECN field of the new Resetting ECN: On encapsulation, setting the ECN field of the new
outer header to be a copy of the ECN field in the incoming header outer header to be a copy of the ECN field in the incoming header
except the outer ECN field is set to the ECT(0) codepoint if the except the outer ECN field is set to the ECT(0) codepoint if the
incoming ECN field is CE ("11"). incoming ECN field is CE ("11").
3. Summary of Pre-Existing RFCs 3. Summary of Pre-Existing RFCs
This section is informative not normative, as it recaps pre-existing This section is informative not normative, as it recaps pre-existing
RFCs. Earlier relevant RFCs that were either experimental or RFCs. Earlier relevant RFCs that were either experimental or
incomplete with respect to ECN tunnelling (RFC2481, RFC2401 and incomplete with respect to ECN tunnelling (RFC2481, RFC2401 and
RFC2003) are briefly outlined inAppendix A. The question of whether RFC2003) are briefly outlined in Appendix A. The question of whether
tunnel implementations used in the Internet comply with any of these tunnel implementations used in the Internet comply with any of these
RFCs is not discussed. RFCs is not discussed.
3.1. Encapsulation at Tunnel Ingress 3.1. Encapsulation at Tunnel Ingress
At the encapsulator, the controversy has been over whether to At the encapsulator, the controversy has been over whether to
propagate information about congestion experienced on the path so far propagate information about congestion experienced on the path so far
into the outer header of the tunnel. into the outer header of the tunnel.
Specifically, RFC3168 says that, if a tunnel fully supports ECN Specifically, RFC3168 says that, if a tunnel fully supports ECN
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Inappropriate changes were not specifically enumerated. RFC4301 did Inappropriate changes were not specifically enumerated. RFC4301 did
not mention inappropriate ECN changes. not mention inappropriate ECN changes.
4. New ECN Tunnelling Rules 4. New ECN Tunnelling Rules
The standards actions below in Section 4.1 (ingress encapsulation) The standards actions below in Section 4.1 (ingress encapsulation)
and Section 4.2 (egress decapsulation) define new default ECN tunnel and Section 4.2 (egress decapsulation) define new default ECN tunnel
processing rules for any IP packet (v4 or v6) with any Diffserv processing rules for any IP packet (v4 or v6) with any Diffserv
codepoint. codepoint.
If absolutely necessary, an alternate congestion encapsulation If unavoidable, an alternate congestion encapsulation behaviour can
behaviour can be introduced as part of the definition of an alternate be introduced as part of the definition of an alternate congestion
congestion marking scheme used by a specific Diffserv PHB (see S.5 of marking scheme used by a specific Diffserv PHB (see S.5 of [RFC3168]
[RFC3168] and [RFC4774]). When designing such new encapsulation and [RFC4774]). When designing such new encapsulation schemes, the
schemes, the principles in Section 7 should be followed. However, principles in Section 7 should be followed. However, alternate ECN
alternate ECN tunnelling schemes are NOT RECOMMENDED as the tunnelling schemes are NOT RECOMMENDED as the deployment burden of
deployment burden of handling exceptional PHBs in implementations of handling exceptional PHBs in implementations of all affected tunnels
all affected tunnels should not be underestimated. There is no should not be underestimated. There is no requirement for a PHB
requirement for a PHB definition to state anything about ECN definition to state anything about ECN tunnelling behaviour if the
tunnelling behaviour if the default behaviour in the present default behaviour in the present specification is sufficient.
specification is sufficient.
4.1. Default Tunnel Ingress Behaviour 4.1. Default Tunnel Ingress Behaviour
Two modes of encapsulation are defined here; `normal mode' and Two modes of encapsulation are defined here; `normal mode' and
`compatibility mode', which is for backward compatibility with tunnel `compatibility mode', which is for backward compatibility with tunnel
decapsulators that do not understand ECN. Section 4.3 explains why decapsulators that do not understand ECN. Section 4.3 explains why
two modes are necessary and specifies the circumstances in which it two modes are necessary and specifies the circumstances in which it
is sufficient to solely implement normal mode. Note that these are is sufficient to solely implement normal mode. Note that these are
modes of the ingress tunnel endpoint only, not the whole tunnel. modes of the ingress tunnel endpoint only, not the whole tunnel.
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intersection of the appropriate incoming inner header (row) and outer intersection of the appropriate incoming inner header (row) and outer
header (column) in Figure 4 (the IPv4 header checksum also changes header (column) in Figure 4 (the IPv4 header checksum also changes
whenever the ECN field is changed). There is no need for more than whenever the ECN field is changed). There is no need for more than
one mode of decapsulation, as these rules cater for all known one mode of decapsulation, as these rules cater for all known
requirements. requirements.
+---------+------------------------------------------------+ +---------+------------------------------------------------+
|Incoming | Incoming Outer Header | |Incoming | Incoming Outer Header |
| Inner +---------+------------+------------+------------+ | Inner +---------+------------+------------+------------+
| Header | Not-ECT | ECT(0) | ECT(1) | CE | | Header | Not-ECT | ECT(0) | ECT(1) | CE |
+---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+ +---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+
| Not-ECT | Not-ECT |Not-ECT(!!!)| drop(!!!)| drop(!!!)| | Not-ECT | Not-ECT |Not-ECT(!!!)|Not-ECT(!!!)| drop(!!!)|
| ECT(0) | ECT(0) | ECT(0) | ECT(1)(!!!)| CE | | ECT(0) | ECT(0) | ECT(0) | ECT(1) | CE |
| ECT(1) | ECT(1) | ECT(1)(!!!)| ECT(1) | CE | | ECT(1) | ECT(1) | ECT(1) (!) | ECT(1) | CE |
| CE | CE | CE | CE(!!!)| CE | | CE | CE | CE | CE(!!!)| CE |
+---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+ +---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+
| Outgoing Header | | Outgoing Header |
+------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+
Unexpected combinations are indicated by '(!!!)' Unexpected combinations are indicated by '(!!!)'
Figure 4: New IP in IP Decapsulation Behaviour Figure 4: New IP in IP Decapsulation Behaviour
This table for decapsulation behaviour is derived from the following This table for decapsulation behaviour is derived from the following
logic: logic:
o If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT the decapsulator MUST NOT o If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT the decapsulator MUST NOT
propagate any other ECN codepoint onwards. This is because the propagate any other ECN codepoint onwards. This is because the
inner Not-ECT marking is set by transports that use drop as an inner Not-ECT marking is set by transports that use drop as an
indication of congestion and would not understand or respond to indication of congestion and would not understand or respond to
any other ECN codepoint [RFC4774]. In addition: any other ECN codepoint [RFC4774]. In addition:
* If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT and the outer ECN field is * If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT and the outer ECN field is CE
ECT(1) or CE the decapsulator MUST drop the packet. the decapsulator MUST drop the packet.
* If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT and the outer ECN field is * If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT and the outer ECN field is
ECT(0) or Not-ECT the decapsulator MUST forward the outgoing Not-ECT, ECT(0) or ECT(1) the decapsulator MUST forward the
packet with the ECN field cleared to Not-ECT. outgoing packet with the ECN field cleared to Not-ECT.
* This specification mandates that any future standards action
SHOULD NOT use the ECT(0) codepoint as an indication of
congestion, without giving strong reasons, given the above rule
forwards an ECT(0) outer as Not-ECT.
o In all other cases where the inner supports ECN, the outgoing ECN o In all other cases where the inner supports ECN, the outgoing ECN
field is set to the more severe marking of the outer and inner ECN field is set to the more severe marking of the outer and inner ECN
fields, where the ranking of severity from highest to lowest is fields, where the ranking of severity from highest to lowest is
CE, ECT(1), ECT(0), Not-ECT. This in no way precludes cases where CE, ECT(1), ECT(0), Not-ECT. This in no way precludes cases where
ECT(1) and ECT(0) have the same severity; ECT(1) and ECT(0) have the same severity;
o Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN fields cannot result o Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN fields cannot result
from any currently used transition in any current or previous ECN from any currently used transition in any current or previous ECN
tunneling specification. These cases are indicated in Figure 4 by tunneling specification. These cases are indicated in Figure 4 by
'(!!!)'). In these cases, the decapsulator SHOULD log the event '(!!!)' or '(!)', where '(!!!)' means the combination is both
and MAY also raise an alarm. Alarms should be rate-limited so invalid and always potentially dangerous, while '(!)' means it is
that the illegal combinations will not amplify into a flood of invalid and possibly dangerous. In these cases, particularly the
alarm messages. It MUST be possible to suppress alarms or more dangerous ones, the decapsulator SHOULD log the event and MAY
logging, e.g. if it becomes apparent that a combination that also raise an alarm. Just because the highlighted combinations
previously was not used has started to be used for legitimate are always invalid, does not mean that all the other combinations
purposes such as a new standards action. An example is an ECT(0) are always valid. Some are only valid if they have arrived from a
inner combined with an ECT(1) outer, which is proposed as a legal particular type of legacy ingress, and dangerous otherwise.
combination for PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding], so an operator Therefore an implementation MAY allow an operator to configure
that deploys support for PCN should turn off logging and alarms in logging and alarms for such additional header combinations known
this case. to be dangerous or invalid for the particular configuration of
tunnel endpoints deployed at run-time.
Alarms should be rate-limited so that the illegal combinations
will not amplify into a flood of alarm messages. It MUST be
possible to suppress alarms or logging, e.g. if it becomes
apparent that a combination that previously was not used has
started to be used for legitimate purposes such as a new standards
action.
The above logic allows for ECT(0) and ECT(1) to both represent the The above logic allows for ECT(0) and ECT(1) to both represent the
same severity of congestion marking (e.g. "not congestion marked"). same severity of congestion marking (e.g. "not congestion marked").
But it also allows future schemes to be defined where ECT(1) is a But it also allows future schemes to be defined where ECT(1) is a
more severe marking than ECT(0), in particular enabling the simplest more severe marking than ECT(0), in particular enabling the simplest
possible encoding for PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding]. This possible encoding for PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding]. This
approach is discussed in Appendix D and in the discussion of the ECN approach is discussed in Appendix D and in the discussion of the ECN
nonce [RFC3540] in Section 9, which in turn refers to Appendix F. nonce [RFC3540] in Section 8, which in turn refers to Appendix F.
4.3. Encapsulation Modes 4.3. Encapsulation Modes
Section 4.1 introduces two encapsulation modes, normal mode and Section 4.1 introduces two encapsulation modes, normal mode and
compatibility mode, defining their encapsulation behaviour (i.e. compatibility mode, defining their encapsulation behaviour (i.e.
header copying or zeroing respectively). Note that these are modes header copying or zeroing respectively). Note that these are modes
of the ingress tunnel endpoint only, not the tunnel as a whole. of the ingress tunnel endpoint only, not the tunnel as a whole.
A tunnel ingress MUST at least implement `normal mode' and, if it A tunnel ingress MUST at least implement `normal mode' and, if it
might be used with legacy tunnel egress nodes (RFC2003, RFC2401 or might be used with legacy tunnel egress nodes (RFC2003, RFC2401 or
skipping to change at page 18, line 44 skipping to change at page 19, line 27
5. Updates to Earlier RFCs 5. Updates to Earlier RFCs
5.1. Changes to RFC4301 ECN processing 5.1. Changes to RFC4301 ECN processing
Ingress: An RFC4301 IPsec encapsulator is not changed at all by the Ingress: An RFC4301 IPsec encapsulator is not changed at all by the
present specification present specification
Egress: The new decapsulation behaviour in Figure 4 updates RFC4301. Egress: The new decapsulation behaviour in Figure 4 updates RFC4301.
However, it solely updates combinations of inner and outer that However, it solely updates combinations of inner and outer that
have never been used on the Internet, even though they were would never result from any protocol defined in the RFC series so
defined in RFC4301 for completeness. Therefore, the present far, even though they were catered for in RFC4301 for
specification adds new behaviours to RFC4301 decapsulation without completeness. Therefore, the present specification adds new
altering existing behaviours. The following specific updates have behaviours to RFC4301 decapsulation without altering existing
been made: behaviours. The following specific updates have been made:
* The outer, not the inner, is propagated when the outer is * The outer, not the inner, is propagated when the outer is
ECT(1) and the inner is ECT(0); ECT(1) and the inner is ECT(0);
* A packet with Not-ECT in the inner and an outer of ECT(1) or CE * A packet with Not-ECT in the inner and an outer of CE is
is dropped rather than forwarded as Not-ECT; dropped rather than forwarded as Not-ECT;
* Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN field have been * Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN field have been
identified as currently unused. These can trigger logging identified as currently unused. These can trigger logging
and/or raise alarms. and/or raise alarms.
Modes: RFC4301 does not need modes and is not updated by the modes Modes: RFC4301 does not need modes and is not updated by the modes
in the present specification. The normal mode of encapsulation is in the present specification. The normal mode of encapsulation is
unchanged from RFC4301 encapsulation and an RFC4301 IPsec ingress unchanged from RFC4301 encapsulation and an RFC4301 IPsec ingress
will never need compatibility mode as explained in Section 4.3 will never need compatibility mode as explained in Section 4.3
(except in one corner-case described below). (except in one corner-case described below).
One corner case can exist where an RFC4301 ingress does not use One corner case can exist where an RFC4301 ingress does not use
IKEv2, but uses manual keying instead. Then an RFC4301 ingress IKEv2, but uses manual keying instead. Then an RFC4301 ingress
could conceivably be configured to tunnel to an egress with could conceivably be configured to tunnel to an egress with
limited functionality ECN handling. Strictly, for this corner- limited functionality ECN handling. Strictly, for this corner-
case, the requirement to use compatibility mode in this case, the requirement to use compatibility mode in this
specification updates RFC4301. However, this is such a remote specification updates RFC4301. However, this is such a remote
possibility that in general RFC4301 IPsec implementations are NOT possibility that RFC4301 IPsec implementations are NOT REQUIRED to
REQUIRED to implement compatibility mode. implement compatibility mode.
5.2. Changes to RFC3168 ECN processing 5.2. Changes to RFC3168 ECN processing
Ingress: On encapsulation, the new rule in Figure 3 that a normal Ingress: On encapsulation, the new rule in Figure 3 that a normal
mode tunnel ingress copies any ECN field into the outer header mode tunnel ingress copies any ECN field into the outer header
updates the ingress behaviour of RFC3168. Nonetheless, the new updates the ingress behaviour of RFC3168. Nonetheless, the new
compatibility mode is identical to the limited functionality mode compatibility mode is identical to the limited functionality mode
of RFC3168. of RFC3168.
Egress: The new decapsulation behaviour in Figure 4 updates RFC3168. Egress: The new decapsulation behaviour in Figure 4 updates RFC3168.
However, the present specification solely updates combinations of However, the present specification solely updates combinations of
inner and outer that have never been used on the Internet, even inner and outer that would never result from any protocol defined
though they were defined in RFC3168 for completeness. Therefore, in the RFC series so far, even though they were catered for in
the present specification adds new behaviours to RFC3168 RFC4301 for completeness. Therefore, the present specification
decapsulation without altering existing behaviours. The following adds new behaviours to RFC3168 decapsulation without altering
specific updates have been made: existing behaviours. The following specific updates have been
made:
* The outer, not the inner, is propagated when the outer is * The outer, not the inner, is propagated when the outer is
ECT(1) and the inner is ECT(0); ECT(1) and the inner is ECT(0);
* A packet with Not-ECT in the inner and an outer of ECT(1) is
dropped rather than forwarded as Not-ECT;
* Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN field have been * Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN field have been
identified as currently unused. These can trigger logging identified as currently unused. These can trigger logging
and/or raise alarms. and/or raise alarms.
Modes: RFC3168 defines a (required) limited functionality mode and Modes: RFC3168 defines a (required) limited functionality mode and
an (optional) full functionality mode for a tunnel. In RFC3168, an (optional) full functionality mode for a tunnel. In RFC3168,
modes applied to both ends of the tunnel, while in the present modes applied to both ends of the tunnel, while in the present
specification, modes are only used at the ingress--a single egress specification, modes are only used at the ingress--a single egress
behaviour covers all cases. The normal mode of encapsulation behaviour covers all cases. The normal mode of encapsulation
updates the encapsulation behaviour of the full functionality mode updates the encapsulation behaviour of the full functionality mode
skipping to change at page 20, line 38 skipping to change at page 21, line 19
both RFC4301 IPsec [RFC4301] and IP in MPLS or MPLS in MPLS both RFC4301 IPsec [RFC4301] and IP in MPLS or MPLS in MPLS
encapsulation [RFC5129] construct the ECN field. encapsulation [RFC5129] construct the ECN field.
Compatibility mode has also been defined so a non-RFC4301 ingress can Compatibility mode has also been defined so a non-RFC4301 ingress can
still switch to using drop across a tunnel for backwards still switch to using drop across a tunnel for backwards
compatibility with legacy decapsulators that do not propagate ECN compatibility with legacy decapsulators that do not propagate ECN
correctly. correctly.
The trigger that motivated this update to RFC3168 encapsulation was a The trigger that motivated this update to RFC3168 encapsulation was a
standards track proposal for pre-congestion notification (PCN standards track proposal for pre-congestion notification (PCN
[I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]). PCN excess rate marking only [RFC5670]). PCN excess rate marking only works correctly if the ECN
works correctly if the ECN field is copied on encapsulation (as in field is copied on encapsulation (as in RFC4301 and RFC5129); it does
RFC4301 and RFC5129); it does not work if ECN is reset (as in not work if ECN is reset (as in RFC3168). This is because PCN excess
RFC3168). This is because PCN excess rate marking depends on the rate marking depends on the outer header revealing any congestion
outer header revealing any congestion experienced so far on the whole experienced so far on the whole path, not just since the last tunnel
path, not just since the last tunnel ingress (see Appendix E for a ingress (see Appendix E for a full explanation).
full explanation).
PCN allows a network operator to add flow admission and termination PCN allows a network operator to add flow admission and termination
for inelastic traffic at the edges of a Diffserv domain, but without for inelastic traffic at the edges of a Diffserv domain, but without
any per-flow mechanisms in the interior and without the generous any per-flow mechanisms in the interior and without the generous
provisioning typical of Diffserv, aiming to significantly reduce provisioning typical of Diffserv, aiming to significantly reduce
costs. The PCN architecture [RFC5559] states that RFC3168 IP in IP costs. The PCN architecture [RFC5559] states that RFC3168 IP in IP
tunnelling of the ECN field cannot be used for any tunnel ingress in tunnelling of the ECN field cannot be used for any tunnel ingress in
a PCN domain. Prior to the present specification, this left a stark a PCN domain. Prior to the present specification, this left a stark
choice between not being able to use PCN for inelastic traffic choice between not being able to use PCN for inelastic traffic
control or not being able to use the many tunnels already deployed control or not being able to use the many tunnels already deployed
skipping to change at page 21, line 45 skipping to change at page 22, line 26
preferable. preferable.
o From the traffic security perspective (enforcing congestion o From the traffic security perspective (enforcing congestion
control, mitigating denial of service etc) copying is preferable. control, mitigating denial of service etc) copying is preferable.
o From the information security perspective resetting is preferable, o From the information security perspective resetting is preferable,
but the IETF Security Area now considers copying acceptable given but the IETF Security Area now considers copying acceptable given
the bandwidth of a 2-bit covert channel can be managed. the bandwidth of a 2-bit covert channel can be managed.
Therefore there are two points against resetting CE on ingress while Therefore there are two points against resetting CE on ingress while
copying CE causes no harm (other than opening a 2-bit covert channel copying CE causes no significant harm.
that is deemed manageable).
5.3.2. Motivation for Changing Decapsulation 5.3.2. Motivation for Changing Decapsulation
The specification for decapsulation in Section 4 fixes three problems The specification for decapsulation in Section 4 fixes three problems
with the pre-existing behaviours of both RFC3168 and RFC4301: with the pre-existing behaviours of both RFC3168 and RFC4301:
1. The pre-existing rules prevented the introduction of alternate 1. The pre-existing rules prevented the introduction of alternate
ECN semantics to signal more than one severity level of ECN semantics to signal more than one severity level of
congestion [RFC4774], [RFC5559]. The four states of the 2-bit congestion [RFC4774], [RFC5559]. The four states of the 2-bit
ECN field provide room for signalling two severity levels in ECN field provide room for signalling two severity levels in
skipping to change at page 23, line 8 skipping to change at page 23, line 36
the box was deployed, often on the grounds that anything the box was deployed, often on the grounds that anything
unexpected might be an attack. This tends to bar future use of unexpected might be an attack. This tends to bar future use of
CU values. The new decapsulation rules specify optional logging CU values. The new decapsulation rules specify optional logging
and/or alarms for specific combinations of inner and outer header and/or alarms for specific combinations of inner and outer header
that are currently unused. The aim is to give implementers a that are currently unused. The aim is to give implementers a
recourse other than drop if they are concerned about the security recourse other than drop if they are concerned about the security
of CU values. It recognises legitimate security concerns about of CU values. It recognises legitimate security concerns about
CU values but still eases their future use. If the alarms are CU values but still eases their future use. If the alarms are
interpreted as an attack (e.g. by a management system) the interpreted as an attack (e.g. by a management system) the
offending packets can be dropped. But alarms can be turned off offending packets can be dropped. But alarms can be turned off
if these combinations come into use (e.g. a through a future if these combinations come into regular use (e.g. a through a
standards action). future standards action).
3. While reviewing currently unused combinations of inner and outer, 3. While reviewing currently unused combinations of inner and outer,
the opportunity was taken to define a single consistent behaviour the opportunity was taken to define a single consistent behaviour
for the cases with a Not-ECT inner header but a different outer. for the three cases with a Not-ECT inner header but a different
RFC3168 and RFC4301 had diverged in this respect. These outer. RFC3168 and RFC4301 had diverged in this respect. None
combinations should not result from known Internet protocols. of these combinations should result from Internet protocols in
So, for safety, it was decided to drop a packet if the outer the RFC series, but future standards actions might put any or all
carries codepoints CE or ECT(1) that respectively signal of them to good use. Therefore it was decided that a
congestion or could potentially signal congestion in a scheme decapsulator must forward a Not-ECT inner unchanged, even if the
progressing through the IETF [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding]. arriving outer was ECT(0) or ECT(1). But for safety it should
Given an inner of Not-ECT implies the transport only understands drop the Not-ECT inner if the arriving outer was CE. Then, if
drop as a signal of congestion, this was the safest course of some unfortunate misconfiguration resulted in a congested router
action. marking CE on a packet that was originally Not-ECT, drop would be
the only appropriate signal for the egress to propagate--the only
signal a non-ECN-capable transport (Not-ECT) would understand.
ECT(1) is being proposed as an intermediate level of congestion
in a scheme progressing through the IETF
[I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding]. But it was decided that it would
still be safe to mandate forwarding as Not-ECT for a Not-ECT
inner with an ECT(1) outer, thus keeping this combination
available for future use. The rationale was as follows: if any
misconfiguration led to ECT(1) congestion signals with a Not-ECT
inner, it would be safe for the egress to suppress these signals.
This is because the congestion would then escalate to CE marking,
which the egress would drop, thus avoiding any risk of congestion
collapse.
Problems 2 & 3 alone would not warrant a change to decapsulation, but Problems 2 & 3 alone would not warrant a change to decapsulation, but
it was decided they are worth fixing and making consistent at the it was decided they are worth fixing and making consistent at the
same time as decapsulation code is changed to fix problem 1 (two same time as decapsulation code is changed to fix problem 1 (two
congestion severity-levels). congestion severity-levels).
6. Backward Compatibility 6. Backward Compatibility
A tunnel endpoint compliant with the present specification is A tunnel endpoint compliant with the present specification is
backward compatible when paired with any tunnel endpoint compliant backward compatible when paired with any tunnel endpoint compliant
skipping to change at page 25, line 13 skipping to change at page 26, line 7
ECN (limited functionality mode) if it is paired with a legacy egress ECN (limited functionality mode) if it is paired with a legacy egress
(RFC 2481, RFC2401 or RFC2003), which would not propagate ECN (RFC 2481, RFC2401 or RFC2003), which would not propagate ECN
correctly. The present specification carries forward those rules correctly. The present specification carries forward those rules
(Section 4.3). It uses compatibility mode whenever RFC3168 would (Section 4.3). It uses compatibility mode whenever RFC3168 would
have used limited functionality mode, and their per-packet behaviours have used limited functionality mode, and their per-packet behaviours
are identical. Therefore, all other things being equal, an ingress are identical. Therefore, all other things being equal, an ingress
using the new rules will interwork with any legacy tunnel egress in using the new rules will interwork with any legacy tunnel egress in
exactly the same way as an RFC3168 ingress (still black-box backward exactly the same way as an RFC3168 ingress (still black-box backward
compatible). compatible).
7. Design Principles for Future Non-Default Schemes 7. Design Principles for Alternate ECN Tunnelling Semantics
This section is informative not normative. This section is informative not normative.
S.5 of RFC3168 permits the Diffserv codepoint (DSCP)[RFC2474] to S.5 of RFC3168 permits the Diffserv codepoint (DSCP)[RFC2474] to
'switch in' alternative behaviours for marking the ECN field, just as 'switch in' alternative behaviours for marking the ECN field, just as
it switches in different per-hop behaviours (PHBs) for scheduling. it switches in different per-hop behaviours (PHBs) for scheduling.
[RFC4774] gives best current practice for designing such alternative [RFC4774] gives best current practice for designing such alternative
ECN semantics and very briefly mentions that tunnelling should be ECN semantics and very briefly mentions in section 5.4 that
considered. Here we give additional guidance on designing alternate tunnelling should be considered. The guidance below extends RFC4774,
ECN semantics that would also require alternate tunnelling semantics. giving additional guidance on designing any alternate ECN semantics
that would also require alternate tunnelling semantics.
In one word the guidance is "Don't". If a scheme requires tunnels to The overriding guidance is: "Avoid designing alternate ECN tunnelling
semantics, if at all possible." If a scheme requires tunnels to
implement special processing of the ECN field for certain DSCPs, it implement special processing of the ECN field for certain DSCPs, it
is highly unlikely that every implementer of every tunnel will want will be hard to guarantee that every implementer of every tunnel will
to add the required exception and that operators will want to deploy have added the required exception or that operators will have
the required configuration options. Therefore it is highly likely ubiquitously deployed the required updates. It is unlikely a single
that some tunnels within a network will not implement the required authority is even aware of all the tunnels in a network, which may
special case. Therefore, designers of new protocols should avoid include tunnels set up by applications between endpoints, or
non-default tunnelling schemes if at all possible. dynamically created in the network. Therefore it is highly likely
that some tunnels within a network or on hosts connected to it will
not implement the required special case.
That said, if a non-default scheme for tunnelling the ECN field is That said, if a non-default scheme for tunnelling the ECN field is
really required, the following guidelines may prove useful in its really required, the following guidelines may prove useful in its
design: design:
On encapsulation in any new scheme: On encapsulation in any new scheme:
1. The ECN field of the outer header should be cleared to Not-ECT 1. The ECN field of the outer header should be cleared to Not-ECT
("00") unless it is guaranteed that the corresponding tunnel ("00") unless it is guaranteed that the corresponding tunnel
egress will correctly propagate congestion markings introduced egress will correctly propagate congestion markings introduced
skipping to change at page 26, line 25 skipping to change at page 27, line 23
Then the code module doing encapsulation can keep to the Then the code module doing encapsulation can keep to the
copying rule and the load regulator module can reset copying rule and the load regulator module can reset
congestion, without any code in either module being congestion, without any code in either module being
conditional on whether the other is there. conditional on whether the other is there.
On decapsulation in any new scheme: On decapsulation in any new scheme:
1. If the arriving inner header is Not-ECT it implies the 1. If the arriving inner header is Not-ECT it implies the
transport will not understand other ECN codepoints. If the transport will not understand other ECN codepoints. If the
outer header carries an explicit congestion marking, the outer header carries an explicit congestion marking, the
packet should be dropped--the only indication of congestion alternate scheme will probably need to drop the packet--the
the transport will understand. If the outer carries any other only indication of congestion the transport will understand.
ECN codepoint the packet can be forwarded, but only as Not- If the outer carries any other ECN codepoint that does not
ECT. indicate congestion, the alternate scheme can forward the
packet, but probably only as Not-ECT.
2. If the arriving inner header is other than Not-ECT, the ECN 2. If the arriving inner header is other than Not-ECT, the ECN
field that the tunnel egress forwards should reflect the more field that the alternate decapsulation scheme forwards should
severe congestion marking of the arriving inner and outer reflect the more severe congestion marking of the arriving
headers. inner and outer headers.
3. If a combination of inner and outer headers is encountered 3. Any alternate scheme MUST define a behaviour for all
that is not currently used in known standards, this event combinations of inner and outer headers, even those that would
should be logged and an alarm raised. This is a preferable not be expected to result from standards known at the time or
approach to dropping currently unused combinations in case from the expected behaviour of the tunnel ingress paired with
they represent an attack. The new scheme should try to define the egress at run-time. Consideration should be given to
a way to forward such packets, but only if a safe outgoing logging such unexpected combinations and raising an alarm,
codepoint can be defined. particularly if there is a danger that the invalid combination
implies congestion signals are not being propagated correctly.
The presence of currently unused combinations may represent an
attack, but the new scheme should try to define a way to
forward such packets, at least if a safe outgoing codepoint
can be defined. Raising an alarm to warn of the possibility
of an attack is a preferable approach to dropping that ensures
these combinations can be usable in future standards actions.
8. IANA Considerations IANA Considerations (to be removed on publication):
This memo includes no request to IANA. This memo includes no request to IANA.
9. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Appendix B.1 discusses the security constraints imposed on ECN tunnel Appendix B.1 discusses the security constraints imposed on ECN tunnel
processing. The new rules for ECN tunnel processing (Section 4) processing. The new rules for ECN tunnel processing (Section 4)
trade-off between information security (covert channels) and trade-off between information security (covert channels) and
congestion monitoring & control. In fact, ensuring congestion congestion monitoring & control. In fact, ensuring congestion
markings are not lost is itself another aspect of security, because markings are not lost is itself another aspect of security, because
if we allowed congestion notification to be lost, any attempt to if we allowed congestion notification to be lost, any attempt to
enforce a response to congestion would be much harder. enforce a response to congestion would be much harder.
Specialist security issues: Specialist security issues:
skipping to change at page 28, line 8 skipping to change at page 29, line 19
'I' will set all ECN fields in outer headers to Not-ECT, 'M' could 'I' will set all ECN fields in outer headers to Not-ECT, 'M' could
still toggle CE or ECT(1) on and off to communicate covertly with still toggle CE or ECT(1) on and off to communicate covertly with
'B', because we have specified that 'E' only has one mode 'B', because we have specified that 'E' only has one mode
regardless of what mode it says it has negotiated. We could have regardless of what mode it says it has negotiated. We could have
specified that 'E' should have a limited functionality mode and specified that 'E' should have a limited functionality mode and
check for such behaviour. But we decided not to add the extra check for such behaviour. But we decided not to add the extra
complexity of two modes on a compliant tunnel egress merely to complexity of two modes on a compliant tunnel egress merely to
cater for an historic security concern that is now considered cater for an historic security concern that is now considered
manageable. manageable.
10. Conclusions 9. Conclusions
This document uses previously unused combinations of inner and outer This document uses previously unused combinations of inner and outer
header to augment the rules for calculating the ECN field when header to augment the rules for calculating the ECN field when
decapsulating IP packets at the egress of IPsec (RFC4301) and non- decapsulating IP packets at the egress of IPsec (RFC4301) and non-
IPsec (RFC3168) tunnels. In this way it allows tunnels to propagate IPsec (RFC3168) tunnels. In this way it allows tunnels to propagate
an extra level of congestion severity. an extra level of congestion severity.
This document also updates the ingress tunnelling encapsulation of This document also updates the ingress tunnelling encapsulation of
RFC3168 ECN to bring all IP in IP tunnels into line with the new RFC3168 ECN to bring all IP in IP tunnels into line with the new
behaviour in the IPsec architecture of RFC4301, which copies rather behaviour in the IPsec architecture of RFC4301, which copies rather
skipping to change at page 28, line 33 skipping to change at page 29, line 44
standards track. Operators wanting to support PCN or other alternate standards track. Operators wanting to support PCN or other alternate
ECN schemes that use an extra severity level can require that their ECN schemes that use an extra severity level can require that their
tunnels comply with the present specification. Nonetheless, as part tunnels comply with the present specification. Nonetheless, as part
of general code maintenance, any tunnel can safely be updated to of general code maintenance, any tunnel can safely be updated to
comply with this specification, because it is backward compatible comply with this specification, because it is backward compatible
with all previous tunnelling behaviours which will continue to work with all previous tunnelling behaviours which will continue to work
as before--just using one severity level. as before--just using one severity level.
The new rules propagate changes to the ECN field across tunnel end- The new rules propagate changes to the ECN field across tunnel end-
points that previously blocked them to restrict the bandwidth of a points that previously blocked them to restrict the bandwidth of a
potential covert channel. But limiting the channel's bandwidth to 2 potential covert channel. Limiting the channel's bandwidth to 2 bits
bits per packet is now considered sufficient. per packet is now considered sufficient.
At the same time as removing these legacy constraints, the At the same time as removing these legacy constraints, the
opportunity has been taken to draw together diverging tunnel opportunity has been taken to draw together diverging tunnel
specifications into a single consistent behaviour. Then any tunnel specifications into a single consistent behaviour. Then any tunnel
can be deployed unilaterally, and it will support the full range of can be deployed unilaterally, and it will support the full range of
congestion control and management schemes without any modes or congestion control and management schemes without any modes or
configuration. Further, any host or router can expect the ECN field configuration. Further, any host or router can expect the ECN field
to behave in the same way, whatever type of tunnel might intervene in to behave in the same way, whatever type of tunnel might intervene in
the path. This new certainty could enable new uses of the ECN field the path. This new certainty could enable new uses of the ECN field
that would otherwise be confounded by ambiguity. that would otherwise be confounded by ambiguity.
11. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Anil Agawaal for pointing out a case where it's safe for a Thanks to Anil Agawaal for pointing out a case where it's safe for a
tunnel decapsulator to forward a combination of headers it does not tunnel decapsulator to forward a combination of headers it does not
understand. Thanks to David Black for explaining a better way to understand. Thanks to David Black for explaining a better way to
think about function placement. Also thanks to Arnaud Jacquet for think about function placement. Also thanks to Arnaud Jacquet for
the idea for Appendix C. Thanks to Michael Menth, Bruce Davie, Toby the idea for Appendix C. Thanks to Michael Menth, Bruce Davie, Toby
Moncaster, Gorry Fairhurst, Sally Floyd, Alfred Hoenes, Gabriele Moncaster, Gorry Fairhurst, Sally Floyd, Alfred Hoenes, Gabriele
Corliano, Ingemar Johansson, David Black and Phil Eardley for their Corliano, Ingemar Johansson, David Black and Phil Eardley for their
thoughts and careful review comments. thoughts and careful review comments.
Bob Briscoe is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project (ICT- Bob Briscoe is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project (ICT-
216372) supported by the European Community under its Seventh 216372) supported by the European Community under its Seventh
Framework Programme. The views expressed here are those of the Framework Programme. The views expressed here are those of the
author only. author only.
12. Comments Solicited Comments Solicited (to be removed by the RFC Editor):
Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be
addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list
<tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors. <tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.
13. References 11. References
13.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[RFC2003] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation [RFC2003] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation
within IP", RFC 2003, October 1996. within IP", RFC 2003, October 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
March 1997. March 1997.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. [RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D.
Black, "The Addition of Explicit Black, "The Addition of Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) to Congestion Notification (ECN) to
IP", RFC 3168, September 2001. IP", RFC 3168, September 2001.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security
Architecture for the Internet Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
13.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding] Briscoe, B. and T. Moncaster, "PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding] Briscoe, B. and T. Moncaster, "PCN
3-State Encoding Extension in a 3-State Encoding Extension in a
single DSCP", single DSCP",
draft-ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding-00 draft-ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding-00
(work in progress), July 2009. (work in progress), July 2009.
[I-D.ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding] Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B., and M. [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding] Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B., and M.
Menth, "A PCN encoding using 2 Menth, "A PCN encoding using 2
DSCPs to provide 3 or more states", DSCPs to provide 3 or more states",
draft-ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding-00
(work in progress), April 2009. (work in progress), April 2009.
[I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding] Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B., and M.
Menth, "Baseline Encoding and
Transport of Pre-Congestion
Information",
draft-ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding-07
(work in progress), September 2009.
[I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour] Eardley, P., "Metering and marking
behaviour of PCN-nodes",
draft-ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour-05
(work in progress), August 2009.
[I-D.ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding] Menth, M., Babiarz, J., Moncaster, [I-D.ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding] Menth, M., Babiarz, J., Moncaster,
T., and B. Briscoe, "PCN Encoding T., and B. Briscoe, "PCN Encoding
for Packet-Specific Dual Marking for Packet-Specific Dual Marking
(PSDM)", (PSDM)",
draft-ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding-00 draft-ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding-00
(work in progress), June 2009. (work in progress), June 2009.
[I-D.ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour] Charny, A., Karagiannis, G., Menth, [I-D.ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour] Charny, A., Karagiannis, G., Menth,
M., and T. Taylor, "PCN Boundary M., and T. Taylor, "PCN Boundary
Node Behaviour for the Single Node Behaviour for the Single
Marking (SM) Mode of Operation", Marking (SM) Mode of Operation",
draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-00 draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-01
(work in progress), July 2009. (work in progress), October 2009.
[I-D.satoh-pcn-st-marking] Satoh, D., Ueno, H., Maeda, Y., and [I-D.satoh-pcn-st-marking] Satoh, D., Ueno, H., Maeda, Y., and
O. Phanachet, "Single PCN Threshold O. Phanachet, "Single PCN Threshold
Marking by using PCN baseline Marking by using PCN baseline
encoding for both admission and encoding for both admission and
termination controls", termination controls",
draft-satoh-pcn-st-marking-02 (work draft-satoh-pcn-st-marking-02 (work
in progress), September 2009. in progress), September 2009.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security
Architecture for the Internet Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., [RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F.,
and D. Black, "Definition of the and D. Black, "Definition of the
skipping to change at page 31, line 35 skipping to change at page 32, line 34
November 2006. November 2006.
[RFC5129] Davie, B., Briscoe, B., and J. Tay, [RFC5129] Davie, B., Briscoe, B., and J. Tay,
"Explicit Congestion Marking in "Explicit Congestion Marking in
MPLS", RFC 5129, January 2008. MPLS", RFC 5129, January 2008.
[RFC5559] Eardley, P., "Pre-Congestion [RFC5559] Eardley, P., "Pre-Congestion
Notification (PCN) Architecture", Notification (PCN) Architecture",
RFC 5559, June 2009. RFC 5559, June 2009.
[RFC5670] Eardley, P., "Metering and Marking
Behaviour of PCN-Nodes", RFC 5670,
November 2009.
[RFC5696] Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B., and M.
Menth, "Baseline Encoding and
Transport of Pre-Congestion
Information", RFC 5696,
November 2009.
[VCP] Xia, Y., Subramanian, L., Stoica, [VCP] Xia, Y., Subramanian, L., Stoica,
I., and S. Kalyanaraman, "One more I., and S. Kalyanaraman, "One more
bit is enough", Proc. SIGCOMM'05, bit is enough", Proc. SIGCOMM'05,
ACM CCR 35(4)37--48, 2005, <http:// ACM CCR 35(4)37--48, 2005, <http://
doi.acm.org/10.1145/ doi.acm.org/10.1145/
1080091.1080098>. 1080091.1080098>.
Appendix A. Early ECN Tunnelling RFCs Appendix A. Early ECN Tunnelling RFCs
IP in IP tunnelling was originally defined in [RFC2003]. On IP in IP tunnelling was originally defined in [RFC2003]. On
encapsulation, the incoming header was copied to the outer and on encapsulation, the incoming header was copied to the outer and on
decapsulation the outer was simply discarded. Initially, IPsec decapsulation the outer was simply discarded. Initially, IPsec
tunnelling [RFC2401] followed the same behaviour. tunnelling [RFC2401] followed the same behaviour.
When ECN was introduced experimentally in [RFC2481], legacy (RFC2003 When ECN was introduced experimentally in [RFC2481], legacy (RFC2003
or RFC2401) tunnels would have discarded any congestion markings or RFC2401) tunnels would have discarded any congestion markings
added to the outer header, so RFC2481 introduced rules for added to the outer header, so RFC2481 introduced rules for
calculating the outgoing header from a combination of the inner and calculating the outgoing header from a combination of the inner and
outer on decapsulation. RC2481 also introduced a second mode for outer on decapsulation. RC2481 also introduced a second mode for
IPsec tunnels, which turned off ECN processing in the outer header IPsec tunnels, which turned off ECN processing(Not-ECT) in the outer
(Not-ECT) on encapsulation because an RFC2401 decapsulator would header on encapsulation because an RFC2401 decapsulator would discard
discard the outer on decapsulation. For RFC2401 IPsec this had the the outer on decapsulation. For RFC2401 IPsec this had the side-
side-effect of completely blocking the covert channel. effect of completely blocking the covert channel.
In RFC2481 the ECN field was defined as two separate bits. But when In RFC2481 the ECN field was defined as two separate bits. But when
ECN moved from the experimental to the standards track [RFC3168], the ECN moved from the experimental to the standards track [RFC3168], the
ECN field was redefined as four codepoints. This required a ECN field was redefined as four codepoints. This required a
different calculation of the ECN field from that used in RFC2481 on different calculation of the ECN field from that used in RFC2481 on
decapsulation. RFC3168 also had two modes; a 'full functionality decapsulation. RFC3168 also had two modes; a 'full functionality
mode' that restricted the covert channel as much as possible but mode' that restricted the covert channel as much as possible but
still allowed ECN to be used with IPsec, and another that completely still allowed ECN to be used with IPsec, and another that completely
turned off ECN processing across the tunnel. This 'limited turned off ECN processing across the tunnel. This 'limited
functionality mode' both offered a way for operators to completely functionality mode' both offered a way for operators to completely
skipping to change at page 33, line 42 skipping to change at page 35, line 4
will have allowed a covert channel from 'M' to 'B'. will have allowed a covert channel from 'M' to 'B'.
ECN at the IP layer is designed to carry information about congestion ECN at the IP layer is designed to carry information about congestion
from a congested resource towards downstream nodes. Typically a from a congested resource towards downstream nodes. Typically a
downstream transport might feed the information back somehow to the downstream transport might feed the information back somehow to the
point upstream of the congestion that can regulate the load on the point upstream of the congestion that can regulate the load on the
congested resource, but other actions are possible (see [RFC3168] congested resource, but other actions are possible (see [RFC3168]
S.6). In terms of the above unicast scenario, ECN effectively S.6). In terms of the above unicast scenario, ECN effectively
intends to create an information channel (for congestion signalling) intends to create an information channel (for congestion signalling)
from 'M' to 'B' (for 'B' to feed back to 'A'). Therefore the goals from 'M' to 'B' (for 'B' to feed back to 'A'). Therefore the goals
of IPsec and ECN are mutually incompatible. of IPsec and ECN are mutually incompatible, requiring some
compromise.
With respect to the DS or ECN fields, S.5.1.2 of RFC4301 says, With respect to the DS or ECN fields, S.5.1.2 of RFC4301 says,
"controls are provided to manage the bandwidth of this [covert] "controls are provided to manage the bandwidth of this [covert]
channel". Using the ECN processing rules of RFC4301, the channel channel". Using the ECN processing rules of RFC4301, the channel
bandwidth is two bits per datagram from 'A' to 'M' and one bit per bandwidth is two bits per datagram from 'A' to 'M' and one bit per
datagram from 'M' to 'A' (because 'E' limits the combinations of the datagram from 'M' to 'A' (because 'E' limits the combinations of the
2-bit ECN field that it will copy). In both cases the covert channel 2-bit ECN field that it will copy). In both cases the covert channel
bandwidth is further reduced by noise from any real congestion bandwidth is further reduced by noise from any real congestion
marking. RFC4301 implies that these covert channels are sufficiently marking. RFC4301 implies that these covert channels are sufficiently
limited to be considered a manageable threat. However, with respect limited to be considered a manageable threat. However, with respect
skipping to change at page 37, line 22 skipping to change at page 38, line 24
| | 12 | = 17% | | 12 | = 17%
0 +-----+---------+---> 0 +-----+---------+--->
0 30% 100% inner header marking 0 30% 100% inner header marking
Figure 7: Tunnel Marking of Packets Already Marked at Ingress Figure 7: Tunnel Marking of Packets Already Marked at Ingress
Appendix D. Why Losing ECT(1) on Decapsulation Impedes PCN Appendix D. Why Losing ECT(1) on Decapsulation Impedes PCN
Congestion notification with two severity levels is currently on the Congestion notification with two severity levels is currently on the
IETF's standards track agenda in the Congestion and Pre-Congestion IETF's standards track agenda in the Congestion and Pre-Congestion
Notification (PCN) working group. The PCN working group requires Notification (PCN) working group. PCN needs all four possible states
four congestion states (not PCN-enabled, not marked and two of congestion signalling in the 2-bit ECN field to be propagated at
increasingly severe levels of congestion marking--see [RFC5559]). the egress, but pre-existing tunnels only propagate three. The four
The aim is for the less severe level of marking to stop admitting new PCN states are: not PCN-enabled, not marked and two increasingly
traffic and the more severe level to terminate sufficient existing severe levels of congestion marking. The less severe marking means
flows to bring a network back to its operating point after a link 'stop admitting new traffic' and the more severe marking means
failure. 'terminate some existing flows', which may be needed after reroutes
(see [RFC5559] for more details). (Note on terminology: wherever
this document counts four congestion states, the PCN working group
would count this as three PCN states plus a not-PCN-enabled state.)
(Note on terminology: wherever this document counts four congestion Figure 2 (Section 3.2) shows that pre-existing decapsulation
states, the PCN working group would count this as three PCN states behaviour would have discarded any ECT(1) markings in outer headers
plus a not-PCN-enabled state.) if the inner was ECT(0). This prevented the PCN working group from
using ECT(1) -- if a PCN node used ECT(1) to indicate one of the
severity levels of congestion, any later tunnel egress would revert
the marking to ECT(0) as if nothing had happened. Effectively the
decapsulation rules of RFC4301 and RFC3168 waste one ECT codepoint;
they treat the ECT(0) and ECT(1) codepoints as a single codepoint.
Although the ECN field gives sufficient codepoints for four states, A number of work-rounds to this problem were proposed in the PCN w-g;
pre-existing ECN tunnelling RFCs prevented the PCN working group from to add the fourth state another way or avoid needing it. Without
using four ECN states in case any tunnel decapsulations occur within wishing to disparage the ingenuity of these work-rounds, none were
a PCN region. If a node in a tunnel changes the ECN field to ECT(0) chosen for the standards track because they were either somewhat
or ECT(1), this change would be discarded by a tunnel egress wasteful, imprecise or complicated:
compliant with RFC4301 or RFC3168. This can be seen in Figure 2
(Section 3.2), where ECT values in the outer header are ignored
unless the inner header is the same. Effectively the decapsulation
rules of RFC4301 and RFC3168 waste one ECT codepoint; they treat the
ECT(0) and ECT(1) codepoints as a single codepoint.
As a consequence, the PCN w-g initially took the approach of a o One uses a pair of Diffserv codepoint(s) in place of each PCN DSCP
standards track baseline encoding for three states to encode the extra state [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding], using
[I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding] and a number of experimental up the rapidly exhausting DSCP space while leaving an ECN
alternatives to add or avoid the fourth state. Without wishing to codepoint unused.
disparage the ingenuity of these work-rounds, none were chosen for
the standards track because they were either somewhat wasteful,
imprecise or complicated. One uses a pair of Diffserv codepoint(s)
in place of each PCN DSCP to encode the extra state
[I-D.ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding], using up the rapidly exhausting DSCP o Another survives tunnelling without an extra DSCP
space while leaving an ECN codepoint unused. Another PCN encoding [I-D.ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding], but it requires the PCN edge
has been proposed that would survive tunnelling without an extra DSCP gateways to share the initial state of a packet out of band.
[I-D.ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding], but it requires the PCN edge gateways
to share state out of band so the egress edge can know which marking o Another proposes a more involved marking algorithm in forwarding
a packet started with at the ingress edge. Yet another work-round to elements to encode the three congestion notification states using
the ECN tunnelling problem proposes a more involved marking algorithm only two ECN codepoints [I-D.satoh-pcn-st-marking].
in forwarding elements to encode the three congestion notification
states using only two ECN codepoints [I-D.satoh-pcn-st-marking]. One o Another takes a different approach; it compromises the precision
work-round takes a different approach; it compromises the precision of the admission control mechanism in some network scenarios, but
of the admission control mechanism in some network scenarios, but manages to work with just three encoding states and a single
manages to work with just three encoding states and a single marking marking algorithm [I-D.ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour].
algorithm [I-D.ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour].
Rather than require the IETF to bless any of these experimental Rather than require the IETF to bless any of these experimental
encoding work-rounds, the present specification fixes the root cause encoding work-rounds, the present specification fixes the root cause
of the problem so that operators deploying PCN can simply require of the problem so that operators deploying PCN can simply require
that tunnel end-points within a PCN region should comply with this that tunnel end-points within a PCN region should comply with this
new ECN tunnelling specification. Universal compliance is feasible new ECN tunnelling specification. On the public Internet it would
for PCN, because it is intended to be deployed in a controlled not be possible to know whether all tunnels complied with this new
Diffserv region. Assuming tunnels within a PCN region will be specification, but universal compliance is feasible for PCN, because
required to comply with the present specification, the PCN w-g is it is intended to be deployed in a controlled Diffserv region.
progressing a trivially simple four-state ECN encoding
[I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding]. Given the present specification, the PCN w-g could progress a
trivially simple four-state ECN encoding
[I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding]. This would replace the interim
standards track baseline encoding of just three states [RFC5696]
which makes a fourth state available for any of the experimental
alternatives.
Appendix E. Why Resetting ECN on Encapsulation Impedes PCN Appendix E. Why Resetting ECN on Encapsulation Impedes PCN
The PCN architecture says "...if encapsulation is done within the The PCN architecture says "...if encapsulation is done within the
PCN-domain: Any PCN-marking is copied into the outer header. Note: A PCN-domain: Any PCN-marking is copied into the outer header. Note: A
tunnel will not provide this behaviour if it complies with [RFC3168] tunnel will not provide this behaviour if it complies with [RFC3168]
tunnelling in either mode, but it will if it complies with [RFC4301] tunnelling in either mode, but it will if it complies with [RFC4301]
IPsec tunnelling. " IPsec tunnelling. "
The specific issue here concerns PCN excess rate marking The specific issue here concerns PCN excess rate marking [RFC5670].
[I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]. The purpose of excess rate marking The purpose of excess rate marking is to provide a bulk mechanism for
is to provide a bulk mechanism for interior nodes within a PCN domain interior nodes within a PCN domain to mark traffic that is exceeding
to mark traffic that is exceeding a configured threshold bit-rate, a configured threshold bit-rate, perhaps after an unexpected event
perhaps after an unexpected event such as a reroute, a link or node such as a reroute, a link or node failure, or a more widespread
failure, or a more widespread disaster. PCN is intended for disaster. Reroutes are a common cause of QoS degradation in IP
inelastic flows, so just removing marked packets would degrade every networks. After reroutes it is common for multiple links in a
flow to the point of uselessness. Instead, the edge nodes around a network to become stressed at once. Therefore, PCN excess rate
PCN domain terminate an equivalent amount of traffic, but at flow marking has been carefully designed to ensure traffic marked at one
granularity. As well as protecting the surviving inelastic flows, queue will not be counted again for marking at subsequent queues (see
this also protects the share of capacity set aside for elastic the `Excess traffic meter function' of [RFC5670]).
traffic. But users are very sensitive to their flows being
terminated while in progress, therefore no more flows should be
terminated than absolutely necessary.
Re-routes are a common cause of QoS degradation in IP networks.
After re-routes it is common for multiple links in a network to
become stressed at once. Therefore, PCN excess rate marking has been
carefully designed to ensure traffic marked at one queue will not be
counted again for marking at subsequent queues (see the `Excess
traffic meter function' of [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]).
However, if an RFC3168 tunnel ingress intervenes, it resets the ECN However, if an RFC3168 tunnel ingress intervenes, it resets the ECN
field in all the outer headers. This will cause excess traffic to be field in all the outer headers. This will cause excess traffic to be
counted more than once, leading to many flows being removed that did counted more than once, leading to many flows being removed that did
not need to be removed at all. This is why the an RFC3168 tunnel not need to be removed at all. This is why the an RFC3168 tunnel
ingress cannot be used in a PCN domain. ingress cannot be used in a PCN domain.
The original reason an RFC3168 encapsulator reset the ECN field was
to block a covert channel (Appendix B.1), with the overriding aim of
consistent behaviour between IPsec and non-IPsec tunnels. But later
RFC4301 IPsec encapsulation placed simplicity above the need to block
the covert channel, simply copying the ECN field.
The ECN reset in RFC3168 is no longer deemed necessary, it is The ECN reset in RFC3168 is no longer deemed necessary, it is
inconsistent with RFC4301, it is not as simple as RFC4301 and it is inconsistent with RFC4301, it is not as simple as RFC4301 and it is
impeding deployment of new protocols like PCN. The present impeding deployment of new protocols like PCN. The present
specification corrects this perverse situation. specification corrects this perverse situation.
Appendix F. Compromise on Decap with ECT(1) Inner and ECT(0) Outer Appendix F. Compromise on Decap with ECT(1) Inner and ECT(0) Outer
A packet with an ECT(1) inner and an ECT(0) outer should never arise A packet with an ECT(1) inner and an ECT(0) outer should never arise
from any known IETF protocol. Without giving a reason, RFC3168 and from any known IETF protocol. Without giving a reason, RFC3168 and
RFC4301 both say the outer should be ignored when decapsulating such RFC4301 both say the outer should be ignored when decapsulating such
 End of changes. 61 change blocks. 
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